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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors involved in the transfer of technology
and the effects on the people involved. In this case, a company is closing one of it's
SBD's in an effort to improve efficiency and gain a more centralized knowledge base by
moving a test engineering organization to the headquarters location. The test group,
known as Equipment Development and Test (EDi), was a small unit of about 150
technical professionals. They were in the process of developing a common test platform
to be used in plants worldwide, when the notice to close up shop and the move was
announced.
This study employed qualitative methods and ethnography in order to capture the
accounts of the people involved in the transition, and the details of the effectiveness of
the transition of the people and technology, from their point of view.
The ability of companies to make wholesale changes of venue, is only modera!ely
successful. There are many factors involved in the transfer of technology, financial ,
corporate, human, communication, and technology factors. Each of these factors is
carefully examined in this study.
One of the major findings was that the large majority of the people involved chose to
either find other employment, or stay with the company locally, if available. The
company underestimated the resolve of the people, and the employability of this diverse
group of engineers and technical professionals. This made the task of transferring the
intellectual property of the group most difficult. The technology being transferred is
really the "expertise" and "vision" of the people in the group, which is something that
can only be moved with the people.
The implications to industry is to study carefully the issues involved, understand what is
bei!?g gained orlost, find out what is important to the individuals, and recognize that
these efforts tend to meet with only limited success. When corporations move entire
organizations geographically, there are few incentives that will actually overcome the
close family ties and bonds to a given area. In short, family is more important than the
job in 1998.
Introduction
Factors Affecting Technology Transfer
Technology transfer can be enhanced by a few key things. The champion of this transfer
can be a major player if he is particularly zealous and committed to it. He can ensure
documentation is properly prepared which is an advantage when rebuttal comes. Another
. .
key ingredient in the technology transfer process is knowing when to transfer to
divisions. Experimenters tend to work on an experiment as long as any improvement
seems possible. This can hinder the process, especially if the product has reached a
profitable state. (ScWie, T., 1995), Imagine a product sent to a division for manufacture
and the plant sets up the tooling and lines and starts producing and selling product
profitably. Then the scientist comes along every other week with a "new and improved"
frersion that requires re-tooling. Needless to say that is where the saying "shoot the
engineer and start production" came from.
Very often the technology gained in one area can be used in another, but communications
and transfers of the fechnology are key elements. One must know what is being done
and how to apply it in their division, before learning how to transfer the technology.
Communication Factors:
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Diffusion of infonnation about new technology is predominantly a process of
communication (Fichman and Kemerer, 1993). Anything that impedes communication
within the organization, as well as within the environment i~ interacts in, will jeopardize
the successful implementation of the technology within the organization (Katz, 1988, P
403). Communication networks are necessary tools in the transfer of the technology;
however, the existing networks have varying capabilities and the proper network type
must be matched Jith the business or industry, in order for it to be effective, (Schlie,T.,
1995). Infonnation processing demands define the type of communications network
required. Whether the network needs phone, fax, modem, conference call or face to face
meetings are determined by the demands of the process. The greater the degree of
differentiation, the greater the communication difficulties.
Financial Factors:
A primary concern is the fiscal justification in tenns of returns on the investment and the
irreversibility of the investment, where adoption requires investments in unsal~ageable
products (Fichman and Kemerer, 1993). The payback period and the significance of the
payback are intrinsic to the justification.
External Factors:
The decision to adopt technology is heavily influenced by environment factors (De La
Garza and Mitropoulos, 1993). These are the events occurring in the industry, market,
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country and the world in general, within which the organization interacts.
Human Factors:
Ultimate users of new technology must do something different from what they have done
in the past. They must change their behavior patterns. A consequence of this is that it
cannot be expected that the recipients will respond to new technology quickly. They
mustnot only assimilate facts relevant to the technology, but also change
behavioral patterns that would lead them to use the technology. Also, it is human natured
to resist ideas, especially those originating from outside of the organization, (Not
invented here), and this can lead to myopia or tunnel vision (Katz, 1988, p442). A clear
implication is that technology transfer requires time, patience and opportunities to
experiment (become familiar with) a new technology (Bunting, p17).
.
The technology transfer issue is sometimes easy as the researchers want to follow their
work, (Bean, A, 1995). T}:le Japanese believe "to move technology, you move people".
Even in the U.S. there is a widely held belief that direct contact between professionals
can provide results superior to that of correspondence and reports. It's
sometimes difficult to get developers to pursue a new idea without a clear understanding
of how it will be used. It is difficult to try to understand the process problems if the end
uSe isn't understood.
Corporate Factors:
The' decision to adopt technology is also heavily influenced by organizational factors (De
La Garza and Mitropoulos, 1993, Noori). Organizations are more likely to be willing and
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able to adopt technologies that offer clear advantages, do not drastically interfere with
existing practices, and are easier to understand. Adopters look unfavorably on
innovations that are difficult to evaluate or which benefits are difficult to see or describe
(Fiehman and Kemerer, 1993).
Technology Factors:
The decision to adopt technology is influenced by the technology itself (De La Garza and
Mitropoulos,1993, Noori). This is a fundamental truth. All other factors being equal, if
the technology fails to live up to the expectations of the eventual users, then its
implementation will not be successful. The CTP platform fits into this category. Due to
the loss of key personnel (champions) the platform never really took off and though it is
still in use, it is much closer to being rejected. "Poor presentaion of CTP to personnel
and bugs (in software) have hindered acceptance by department and customers", (Mgr.
TEO). According to one engineer tasked with using and developing test platforms with
CTP, "it requires mentors to practically apply it, and most ofthem left the company".
( Test Engineer).
Timeline
In Late 1995, a team was formed to study the possibility of consolitdating organizations
and moving all of the separate test organizations into the Electronics Test Center (ETC)
in the midwest. The company has been in a major restructuring of all organizations since
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the announcement of the company 2000 initiative, announced in 1992. This particular
endeavor was first unveiled to the personnel at EDT in Germantown in a February
meeting in 1996, with all of the management team present. The idea was presented that
the EDT facility would move to ETC over a period of 12 -18 months, with the company
realizing an overall savings of some $50 Million over five years.
This meeting served as a notice that something was being looked at and the future of
EDT in its current location was uncertain at best.
On May 1st, 1996, the official announcement came by way of a press release; the internal
company network had the announcement on line the day before. Along with the
announcement came news that there would be specific option packages provided to all
full time salaried employees by July 1st, 1996. As with most things, the actual
information was delayed, and didn't make it into the employees hands until August 1st,
1996.,
The package, that was given to each employee included what the VRS (Voluntary
Resignation of Services, or severance package) would look like if that were chosen, what
date was given for transfer to headquarters, if that option were chosen, or what date to
transfer to the Available Work Assignment (AWA) pool. Each of the options carried
with it a date for when action must be taken.
Once the packages were delivered, the individual employees were given six weeks in
which to make the decision they would have to live with. While trying to decide, the
company provided significant assistance to employees, spouses and families in the form
of career counseling, financial counseling, and personal counseling if desired.
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The company wanted to show that though it was a large oligopoly, it still valued each and
"everyone of its employees, and was willing to go the extra mile to ensure that all of them
had whatever help was needed in order to reduce the angst of the transition that the
business case had thrust upon them.
The VRS package;-for instance, included severance pay equal to one months salary for
each year of employment, but not less than six months; as well as job placement help in
the form of a fully staffed office, with professional resume writing help, mailings, job
listings, and weekly career counseling assistance. The package also included educational
funds to retrain in another field, if desired. The company seemed to be saying thank you
for your dedicated service.
For those that opted to stay with the company and move to headquarters, an enhanced
relocation package was offered, with trips to the new area, sponsors, and other incentives.
By the end of September, 1996, all decisions had to be made, and the managers were
expected to move to TEO by that time.
The original intention was to have the building closed by June of 1997, and only a
skeleton crew available by the end of Dec. 1996. However, when the plants (customers)
found out about the change, they feared their source for equipment, expertise, and support
was going away, and they dropped many new orders on the facility in a very short time;
something akin to panic buying when a shortage is expected. This was not planned for,
and resulted in keeping the facility in operation for 21 months, slightly beyond the
intended closure.
Attrition started to reduce the numbers of engineers available to do the work, and projects
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were continually getting into time trouble as the ability to staff the projects dwindled,
forcing customers to find other sources for their needs. This was actually part of the
overall company plan to have the plants become more self-reliant for their capital
equipment needs.
By the fall of 1997, there was only about 65 people left from that group, as most had
transferred or quit. A group of these test engineers were slowly being moved to the
Upper Darby Electronics Facility (UDEF), due to the large volume of work that EDT did
for UDEF, specifically on EEC (Electronic Engine Comol). The original intention was to
have only about six of these engineers at UDEF, however, it became apparent this would
never be enough to do the continuing support work, let alone the advanced engineering.
Throughout 1997, the plant, which is only five miles from the EDT location, started to
absorb more and more of the engineers that had no intention of leaving the area. As 1997
came to a close, the new test group was in place, though it was officially a part of TEO
but residing in the plant. The group was larger than anticipated, but staffed with some of
the best engineers that EDT had to offer.
In March of 1998, EDT finally closed its doors for the last time, and the specialized
group of Test Equipment designers and builders came to an end.
TEO, in the meantime, was going through its own changes, and by summer of 1997, the
leadership changed, and the name along with it. The name Test Engineerin~
Organization (TEO) was now history, and the new group "Product Assurance" (PA) took
its place, headed by a new manager. The EDTffEO manager, who had the task of
consolidating the previous organization moved on, and the new managers task now was
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to get PA out of the equipment building business altogether. His is a task to develop
local sources , and internal test groups, for each of the plants in order to meet their
equipment needs.
One other item of note, in October of 1997, The company announced the formation of a
new Enterprise called "Viseon". Viseon is the name given to the Components Division
(CD), which was the parent organization for EDT, TEO and Product Assurance. Viseon
is intended to be a more marketable name in the global community, encouraging outside
sales (CD was internally captive for the most part), and allow the company to concentrate
on its core business. There are financial (shareholder) advantages to this arrangement,
and the company is already starting to reap the benefits.
"The company phases out design facility" (Headline by Ryan R. Fischer, Philadelphia
Inquirer, May 1, 1996).
With that headline on May 1st, 1996, the company formally announced the process of
shutting down an engineering firm based in Germantown, Pa. This is a study of the
process of integrating the knowledge and experience of about 150 highly skilled test
engineers into a new organization.
After an intensive study, the company's Technology and Process Leadership Office has
decided to phase out the test equipment design and build operation located in
Germantown, Pa. The work from that facility will be consolidated with related functions
in Headquarters.
The consolidation is part of an on-going effort to link all phases of test, design, and
development closely with the product development process and the new Engineering test
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facility in Headquarters.
No layoffs will occur with the consolidation. Every full time regular salaried employee
at Germantown will be offered another assignment within The company. Contract
personnel will be given at least 60 days advanced notice that their contract will not be
renewed.
The Germantown phase-out will occur over the next 12 to 18 months. The action is
designed to eliminate redundancies, resulting in improved quality, shorted development
time, more effective in-process testing and reduced costs. (PROOFS Bulletin Board
news release, CN News, May 1, 1996)
The Germantown operation, known as Equipment Development & Test (EDT), employs
72 full time non-union workers. Marty of these employees are expected to transfer to The
company's new facility in the midwest, where the company is consolidating its testing
programs. A few may also find work at The company's components plant in Upper
Darby. "No one will be laid off here", according to company spokesman, Jared Hoyle.
The employees, most of whoin are engineers, were told about the company's decision
May 1st, though they have known for some time the move was being considered. Some
employees have already been transferred to other company sites.
There are an additional 80 contract workers at the site, and they will be given at least 60
days notice before their work ends. "We just wanted the people to know that we've
appreciated their work and give them some sense of direction" Hoyle said.
The company will also provide moving allowances to help employees who are relocated.
Hoyle explained that the Germantown facility tests the design of electronic parts before
they are approved for mass production and use in the company's products.
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The operation is not directly linked to The company's Upper Darby plant, which still
employs around 1900 workers. The company has leased its' current facility since 1992,
pulling together several small groups that concentrated on specific plants, into one larger
group that would manage all of the test equipment needs.
"They're examples of locations where the function being performed could be done more
effectively or efficiently somewhere else", Hoyle said. The consolidation will also
eliminate redundant testing at different sites, while also reducing the development time of
the parts.
Another 45 people worked at the Arlington site, which closed at the end of 1996.
Both the Arlington and the Germantown shutdowns are linked to the recently adopted
company 2000 strategy; which calls for the reevaluation of all the company's processes
and products. (Ryan R.Fischer staff writer, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 1, 1996)
RESEARCH SETTING
Background
The company under study, developed a test equipment platform that was designed to
commonize the industry for their customers. It is called the Common Test Platform
(CTP). It is a set of hardware and software that will be essentially the same for all
customers. This particular company has customers in seven different countries
worldwide, and each of these customers has their own particular requirements and
esthetic needs for their equipment. This has added up to well over 100 different types of
platforms, each with different sizes of cabinets, different hardware and electronics and
custom software, even different software languages. Imagine the monumental task of
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trying to support all of these different platforms while trying to develop the equipment
for the new products that are constantly being added to the task!
There was one attempt to make the software common, for at least one plant. What ended
up happening there, was the test code, written in HP basic, grew to such gigantic size,
that the computer had to have an upgraded processor and hard drive just to store the
program. This "shell" as it was called, held the code for all the programs for all of the
products in an entire plant. As new products came on line, the shell would provide space
for the new test code to be inserted, and the shell would be revised to include the new
programs. For some of the hardware platforms specific product lines, this shell worked
fairly well, for others it became a nightmare of complexity and needless memory storage.
Some of the projects were fairly small, and needed only a small and inexpensive
computer, but the requirements of the shell mandated that the larger and more expensive
computer
hardware be bought for the application to be able to run this shell. Clearly a better
method was needed. Upper management saw the need and set a task force to study the
issue. The result was the CTP which combined all of the many platforms into one basic
platform with only a few variations for low cost and high cost (requirement) test
capability. In all cases the software drivers would be the same. These are the software
modules that tell the instruments how to communicate with the computer and the device
under test (DDT). With these common drivers, the software simplified-greatly. There is
still, and always will be a need for custom software since there will always be new
products and processes, however, the commonality that is now available will greatly
reduce development time. Additionally, the new software is written in C++, which is
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considerably faster than the HP basic, and it is more portable than its predecessor.
The CTP platform has certain hardware that will be "common" to all of the systems, such
as VXI chassis and plug-in cards that are used to send stimuli to the device under test,
and also to take the measurements from the DUT. The computers are all standard models
and the commonality of using the same equipment, drivers and software will greatly
reduce the need to train people. Instead of having to learn each custom platform over and
over again, one platform can be learned, and the knowledge transferred directly to the
next system because the software is the same, the test structures are the same, and the
hardware is the same. Another advantage to the CTP platform is that the group spent
considerable time and effort lining up suppliers and getting some really large volume
discounts on the components because there would be larger numbers of each of the
components ordered. Plus, by bundling some pieces together in useful configurations,
some real cost savings could be realized, which were then passed on to the customers.
This was a key selling point for the CTP platform when it was rolled out to the
plants. The plants were seeing 30-50% reductions in costs- for hardware ov~r what they
could get by going directly to the suppliers themselves. This also helped with the
ordering of spares, as the quantity discounts continued to mount with each purchase.
Of course, this is not without its detractors in the plants. They now must learn the new
system (again), instead of specifying what they are comfortable with. The choices they
have will be greatly reduced, and they had to do something beyond 'what we have always
done in the past'. The old guard wasn't ready to embrace anything new, and in reality
felt why should we use something that is unproven, when we already have existing
platforms that do what we want them to do. When new knowledge is required, there is
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always some pretty stiff resistance to it. It is also quite difficult to take an industry that
has been built on developing custom solutions and try to develop a standard product. In
reality, there will always be a certain percentage of custom work, even within the eTP,
but this platform will allow far more of the systems to be standardized than ever before.
How a given product is attached to a load, and what specific signals are needed, what
patterns need to be generated, whether it needs 5v logic or 3v, etc.
Many requirements cannot be standardized, but the vision is to move closer to the
standardization and away from mass customization. Top management wants to get away
from buying custom equipment for each new product, but the customers require new
customized features that change the requirements for the equipment, heading the effort
back towards the custom area once again. It is like a giant seesaw, with both sides
saying they want equilibrium, but neither is willing to give up what is viewed as their
competitive advantage. No one wants to lose customers, and the ultimate customer, the
consumers, are the ones that have the insatiable appetite for the "new products" that do
more than anything else has before. When a firm decides to move or consolidate, the
normal means of transferring technology is by moving the people who are in possession
of the intellectual property upon which the firm depends. In all cases it requires upper
management support whenever new systems are put into place,~ithout this support,
the technology transfer is doomed to rejection, much like a human body will reject
transplant organs. Upper management in this case would be that part of the body that
controls the immune system. The immune system would be the existing system that
is having the new technology grafted into it.
There is always a danger of rejection whenever something new is introduced into an
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existing organization. In this study, the existing organization is a large electronics firm
headquartered in the midwest, and the transplanting organization is a test engineering
group in the northeast. The technology transfer is actually moving to. two different
locations through people transfers. The actual transfer of technology can only go a
limited distance through the use of documentation, procedures, software and the like.
These are the hard artifacts that are necessary to do the work, but for the creativity,
expertise, vision, and application, it requires the long years of experiential learning that
resides within the intellectual property of the people that are needed to do the job.
An organization is not just a set of buildings, hardware and software programs, but the
sum total of all the learning and experience of all the people. The organization is the
people. The technology resides within the minds of the people, because it is the people
that will ultimately use whatever hardware, or software are provided.
Mission
Test Equipment Organization (TEO) is the new organziation that has resulted from the
consolidation of other organizations, EDT being one of them. The mission of this new
organization is to work closely with the Product Engineers, and develop test methods and
strategies and ensure that the products are 'designed for testability and
manufacturability'. By working with the PEO engineers on the front end of the projects,
efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced as the ability to test the product is designed in
and the cost of developing test equipment is reduced. By having these cross disciplinary
teams work together, there is a shorter development cycle for the actual high speed, high
15
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volume production test equipment that ultimately needs to be developed for the plant that
will produce the new product.
Purpose
The technology being transferred is the knowledge of high volume testing, and building
of the equipment into a turnkey solution for the industry's electronics manufacturing
plants. It has long been the desire of the company to have the design testing facility
closely linked (location-wise) to the Product Engineering Organization (PED). The move
of EDT to TED is the realization of this desire. The company expects to show
savings of perhaps $50 Million over five years through this particular move.
The company has restructured the organization to allow test engineers, called Product
Development engineers (PD) to work side by side with their PED counterparts on a
given project. The intention here is ensure that products are "designed for testability" on
the front end, rather than having to re-design later. Both the PD and PED engineer
benefit from this type of arrangement, as both their respective design skills are enhanced
from working together. Additionally, the specifications for the product are co-written,
enabling the PD test engineer to work on a test solution much earlier in the program, in
effect, lengthening the time to create a test solution. This has been one of the primary
difficulties in the past with having the test design facility removed from the
product design facility. When a plant needed the equipment for a new line, it would have
only 6-8 months lead time from product launch. This normally resulted in schedules
being missed, customers not receiving parts, and assembly plants being idled. Sometimes
launch dates would be pushed out for a given product while waiting for the product to
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launch at the plant. Needless to say, this was a method of creating great emotional
trauma for many managers, and project leaders who were caught in the middle of a
system that afforded insufficient time to properly research and design a solution.
The challenges of moving an organization, the people with the knowledge, and
convincing management that this was a savvy move were indeed daunting. Many
possibilities were studied, including having "cell test groups" in each of the plants, so
they would be able to design and develop their own test methods and equipment. This
idea, had some promise, but it required the plants to staff up with highly trained test
engineers, encompassing all engineering disciplines. It also required that these plants
would have to dedicate these people to the new projects and support them by taking away
their other responsibilities when working on a new project. Life at a
manufacturing plant is not conducive to this type of scenario. Engineers are quickly
inundated with myriad responsibilities, and are typically relegated to a "fire-fighting"
mode of operation, where the biggest fire gets the attention. To actually free up an
engineer to work on a forward project exclusively just would not happen. Plants are set
up to run lean, i.e. with as few people as possible in the maintenance and engineering
disciplines. This is intended to reduce overhead, and make the plant more profitable
overall. This is why internal test groups, though previously tried, are rarely capable of
taking on all of the advanced projects that come into a plant. Plus, it requires having the
infrastructure to do the intricate machine shop work that is necessary to create the custom
fixturing needed to interface with the products. To put engineers in a plant with
knowledge of robotics, networks, optics, programming, power electronics, RF signal
processing, digital and analog design and all aspects of mechanical engineering would
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require a very large and dedicated staff, which would raise the overhead substantially.
This was the value of the EDT organization. EDT encompassed all of the necessary
disciplines in one building. They also had the infrastructure in the local area that would
add the necessary support in the form of parts procurement, machine shops, and a host of
other attributes that enabled timely completion of projects. In the move to TEO, this
infrastructure was lost and a new one had to be set up. There will always be a loss when
technology transfers take place. Additionally, many of the most highly skilled and
trained people did not transfer with the organization; many left for new jobs, and only a
few stayed with the local plant, as staffing requirements kept that to a minimum.
METHODS
This study employed qualitative methods because I wanted to capture the accounts of the
people involved in the transition and the details of the effectiveness (from their point of
view), of the transition of the people and the technology they represented to the
company.
SAMPLING
As is appropriate in qualitative research, theoretical sampling was used (Glaser, 1976;
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To assure that the data came from all levels of The company,
all employees involved in the transition were invited to participate in the study, though
the focus was on the 72 full time company employees that were given the options of
staying with the company or accepting a severance package. .'
Of the twenty two employees that opted to stay with the company, ten individuals
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volunteered and were interviewed. They were also asked to fill out a survey, and were
contacted several times throughout the study for conversations concerning the status of
the transistion.
DATA COLLECTION
Interviews were conducted for the most part by phone and e-mail, as we were not in the
same location. Questions about what was important to them, how they viewed the
company and their particular contributions to the work effort at EDT were asked.
Typically, though, the backgounds of the individuals was known to the reseacher, as he
was one of the displaced engineers in the study, and as such worked side by side with the
interviewees. The surveys were followed up with additional phone conversations,
eliciting comments on the various questions presented. Four of the people were
intereviewed more than once, as a continuing dialogue between us. The normal process
of maintaining contact for and through work required some level of communication in a
more or less continous mode.
DATA ANALYSIS
The data for this study consists of surveys handed out to engineers, managers, and
technicians from EDT. The sample is small, owing to the small number of people
involved in the transition, and the concentration on the company employees only. There
were only 72 company employees to select from, and of these, only 22 agreed to move
with the company. The surveys are split evenly between those who went to Upper
Darby, and those who went to headquarters.
Due to the small size, virtually all of the respondents were personnally interviewed.
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There were many conversations and observations of the process as the researcher was one
of the employees involved in the transfer (ethnographic research).
The method chosen to analyze the data was the grounded theory methodology (Glaser,
1976; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1988), primarily to derive new theoretical insights
from the data. The transcripts of the interviews and surveys were coded using constant
comparative analysis in which each incident was assigned to an emergent open coding
scheme (Strauss & Corbin, 1990:61-74), until all interviews had been coded (Browning,
1978). There were an initial 41 codes which were reduced through axial coding (Strauss
& Corbin, 1990:96-115). Through the process of selective coding (Strauss & Corbin,
1990:116-142), these categories were further collapsed to six categories and these were
renamed as the factors in the transition.
VALIDITY
The processes involved in the constant comparative method used in this study include
internal checks on the validity of the data. As data are collected and coded, conceptual
categories were developed, and tentative hypotheses emerge. Questions about certain
matters of fact will also arise as important to understanding and interpreting the data.
Additional data can then be collected to test the bounds of conceptual categories, matters
of fact, and tentative hypotheses from additional sources of data. As the research
proceeded and new data collected, they are constantly being compared to prior data in
terms of categories and hypoteses. When new data yield new or inconsistent information,
conceptual categories and the emerging theories are modified to take them into account.
Considering the constant level of changes in the company, there was a cutoff point, so
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that this study will actually be more of a slice of life presentation, since the changes in the
organization will never stop. Against this backdrop, the process of refining the data is
repeated until no new categories emerge, and no new information inconsistent with the
categories and tentative hypotheses are being generated (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss
& Corbin, 1990). The methods employed permitted some within method and between
methods triangulation. The data obtained could be compared from interviews with the
data available in the newpapers, documents, PROOFS, and observations. A kind of time
triangulation was employed as well, in which some information was obtained from
people who had been in the situation before, where the company tried to move the test
group out to headquarters. (The previous efforts were even less successful according to
40 year veterans of the company.) In qualitative research, the primary checks on validity
are among informants and between them as acrhival sources. Only data that were
consistent across informants and soruces are reported here.
DISCUSSION
Several categories have come out of the research, these are the factors that affect overall
effectiveness of this type of transfer. These factors are: financial, human, corporate or
'"ll!i:o!f
organizational, communications, technology and external factors. When comparing the
transition of people and technology from EDT to UDEF and TEO, they can be separated
as a specifically unique set of characteristics that contrast in some aspects and are
generally the same regardless of location.
FINANCIAL FACTORS
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Financial factors had a great deal to do with the initial decision to create TEO. It has
long been the desire of The company to move the test organization to headquarters to
enable a more cohesive and effective interchange of information between product
engineers and test engineers. This would increase the overall effectiveness of the design
and development efforts of the company and result in shorter development cycles and
faster marketing cycles that would actually get the products in the customers hands.
Creating the business case to make the move financially appealing to the company was a
requirement.
After a careful study of the costs involved with maintaining separate organizations
resulted in a cost benefit analysis that was expected to yield $50 Million in savings over
five years, the transition was commissioned, and the announcement was made. The cost
benefit analysis included factors such as maintaining their own support systems,
overhead, buildings and real estate (that was cheaper in Southeastern Pa.), travel costs,
lost revenue due to late delivery of equipment tied to poor communication and short
notice to kick off new designs, and the high cost of personnel and machines. The study
also considered the anticipated loss of skilled personnel due to the move (20-30%
expected), and the fact that EDT was set up as a cost center meaning it was not supposed
to make a profit on its internal customers. Additionally, the market segment that EDT
was involved in (Turnkey electronic test solutions) was getting more and more expensive,
with greater competition for the second and third iterations of their designs.
EDT would create the initial one or two designs, and generally, another contractor would
pick up the repeat business (and profits). EDT would bear the total cost of the
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engineering and design efforts, and because of the need to keep the best and most skilled
people to accomplish this task, the other companies that competed on this business, had a
better cost structure and they were able to under bid for the follow on work. This
arrangement was one that the plants enjoyed, as they would see an overall lower cost for
their equipment. It did not however, create a good business case for keeping EDT in
operation. It was becoming painfully obvious that the function of EDT had outlived its
ability to generate revenue in the extremely difficult business segment of providing
turnkey solutions to plants for their high volume production lines. The support alone was
an onerous burden, as the streamlining of the company's overall operating infrastructure
at the plants, required EDT to support more than 100 separate test platforms. The test
engineers of EDT were in fact the "interface layer" of engineering that had been taken
out of the plants, which in the past had been the ones who would make the engineering
products and the production and test functions on the lines work together in a smooth
orchestration.
The fact that EDT was set up to be a cost center meant it was not supposed to make a
profit on its internal customers, but that generally means by default, you will lose money.
The annual deficits were growing, and in a bold move, consistent with the overall long-
term objectives of the company 2000 strategy, the company opted to get out ofthe
equipment engineering business, and focus on its core business. This signaled the
beginning of the end for EDT. According to one of the long term EDT engineers, Armin
(EE,), "EDT was too big, and getting out of control, which garnered too much attention
and funding from The company".
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HUMAN FACTORS
Overall, the people involved in the transition felt it was a positive move, for both the
company and the people. Whether one went to UDEF as a TEO employee or as a plant
employee, or whether one went to TEO at headquarters, the change was viewed as a good
decision. As one manager, Bryan stated, "it improved communications between testing
and PEa". Timely communications has always been a major difficulty between the two
groups. Another positive as stated by Cal, a project team leader (PTL), "the benefit
received from the change is that the people who have moved to TEO have effectively
'mainstreamed' their careers, being at the company's headquarters gives them better
benefits and better accessibility to career benefiting job opportunities". Cal is one of the
TEO employees that have been co-located to UDEF, meaning he didn't have to move.
Those who stayed at the UDEF facility also felt the change was positive for both the
company and the employees. Displacement from family, friends, and known life style
was looked upon negatively by all respondents to the survey. Those who went to UDEF
had no displacement of this type and cited it as a positive. They did however, have the
job change to a new area and a new infrastructure, and that in itself is a displacement. As
one PTL put it, "the opportunity to stay in the area was welcomed, I think I would be one
of those that left the company had the offer to stay not been an option; yet, even though I
have the same supervisor and responsibilities, it was not the positive career step I
envisioned".
Job security is another area of concern for employees in the 1990's, as it has always been.
On the surface one would expect that moving to headquarters and 'mainstreaming' your
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career within the TEO department would give people a greater sense of security. Yet,
this question was met with virtual ambiguity. Only one respondent was positive in his
opinion stating, "I am better able to display my worth to the company" (Supv). Other
responses were "None of us is ever secure" (EE); and "I feel my position is secure
regardless of the company's move" (PTL); and "this move does not affect my job
security" (Supv).
It appears job security was not part of the motivation for or against moving with the
company. In this aspect, it is possible that the company planners seriously misunderstood
the job security aspect and what was important to the people involved in this transition.
On the question of whether the job was the most important in one's life in the 1990's, the
response was virtually unanimous that it was not! Family came up as the first priority on
nearly all responses. Even the dissenters (that agreed the job is #1) stated "No job, no
life! We're meant to work, one cannot provide for your family without ajob" (EE).
Even when the job is highly regarded, there is an underlying need to take care of family,
and the job is considered a means to an end, and not an end in itself. A long term
manager stated, "how important (the job is) is a function of ones time with the company,
age, and station in life". All agreed the job is important, but not the most important
aspect of ones life. A mix of family, quality of life, hobbies, religion are all important
aspects, and none should be significantly more valued than others, an equilibrium or
balance seemed to be the overriding theme.
Perhaps this attitude towards the job isn't universal, but specific to this type of
professional. Maybe it is attributable to the concentration of specialized and marketable
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skills that his group represents. There certainly was no difficulty in finding other suitable
employment for those who chose to leave the company and work in the local area.
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS
Integrating the people and technology from an organization that is being displaced and
geographically relocated provides some interesting challenges. Immediately the
organizational structure will change, "there are now more players in the chain of
command", according to one EE. In this move the EDT manager tasked with the
transition, also became the department manager of the new organization, TEO. The size
of his overall organization tripled, the requirements and charter for the new department
also grew, though the mission grew larger than the organization (initially).
Conversely, UDEF developed a small in-house group that was part of the TEO
organization and ultimately accountable to them. It was, by most accounts, easier to
maintain customer support for the UDEF group, as they were tasked with supporting only
UDEF programs. TEO had the task of supporting seven electronics plants worldwide.
The UDEF group, though smaller than in past years, continued to do business as usual,
with known customers and known requirements. They were quite short handed, as the
talent drain continued its exodus to headquarters and out of the company in some cases.
The TEO task was far more daunting with their global focus, along with developing a
new organization and defining the roles and responsibilities, that were not well
understood. Customers were unsure who to turn to for help, and the loss of so many
people made the transition all the more difficult. Only 22 of 72 full time employees
chose the headquarters option, far different from the initial attrition estimates of 20 -
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30%.
EDT was expected to bring with it the common test platform (CTP), which was intended
to make the equipment in all of the plants more standard, thereby reducing the training,
maintenance and design costs. One of the biggest weaknesses of this transition is that
most of the CTP core group left the company, leaving no actual champions to push the
program. As one manger put it, "poor presentation of CTP to personnel and bugs in the
software have hindered acceptance by the department and customers". (Supv).
The CTP platform was a marvelous idea for a long range project that had the promise to
reduce the need for large support staffs, and create a look and feel (through software and
standard hardware) that was the same across all plants. This was a huge undertaking, and
really was in trouble from the beginning, due to the decision to move EDT, just one year
after launching this project. The CTP project, was expected to take 3-4 years to develop,
and realistically, another 2-3 years to work out all of the bugs. However, with only one
year of focused development, and then 18 months of transitional development where the
loss of skilled personnel was a weekly occurrence, the program faltered. TEO was
struggling to get the new organization developed and kicked off, and there just was not
enough resources to continue the focused effort.
During the transitional phase out of EDT, it became increasingly difficult to keep the
focus on work, for managers, and rank and file workers as well. Many hours were spent
discussing the myriad possibilities, company options and the fate of the contract workers.
Even the most dedicated workers were drawn into the conversations, resulting in a loss of
productivity throughout the workforce. Overall though, the attitude of the people,
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uncertain future and all, could be characterized as professional, as they did continue to
work, and projects still were delivered. Delivery dates did start to slip due to the
continuous loss of resources, and the constant shifting of engineers and technicians from
one project to another. Many resourceswould leave in the middle of a project, and what
had been a system of rating projects "red" when they were behind, became meaningless.
All the projects were red, and there was little that could be done about it. The constant
reshuffling of people created an instability that reduced the effectiveness of some project
teams, and as one senior engineer stated, "frustration took the best of some people".
Organizationally, it was strongly agreed. that technology (such as CTP) is transferred by
moving people. Not that it's the only way, but, the transfer is "enhanced when people are
involved", according to one PTL. "Mentors are needed to practically apply the
technology", says Arrnin(EE). The technology in this event is not a single technology
like the semi-conductor industry routinely transfers, but it encompasses large blocks of
experiential learning of the art and science of the design and development of high volume
production test systems. There is no single technology, even with CTP there are multiple
disciplines that are encompassed, and there is no substitute for decades of experiential
learning.
The new organization (TEO) had no shortage of challenges, and even with the additional
people from the other departments, the group started out seriously short handed, and
continued to fight an uphill battle with few resources and great demands. The department
objectives were far larger in scope than it was able to staff, even with a full complement
of engineers. All of the plants wanted their support, and wanted "their resident
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engineers", which threatened to take even more of an already short staff. As one of the
PTL's said, " it will always take longer (the transition) than anyone planned; change is
always resisted and this resistance cannot be quantified in planning, everything new goes
though this process". In effect he's saying if you're going to make a move like this, it
will cause a certain amount of pain (usually more than expected), to the company,
management, employees and customers alike.
TECHNOLOGY FACTORS
The company will lose technology due to this move was a consensus, regardless of the
location or disposition of given individuals. 50 of 72 full time engineers left, leaving
some serious holes in the expertise of the company. This 'expertise' of how to solve
these complex test issues and turn them into high performance, high volume production
machines was the real technology of EDT. It was the competitive advantage and core
competency of this group of highly skilled engineers and technical professionals. One of
the supervisors that moved to TEO stated, "those who did not move to TEO were a base
of technology and experience that was lost".
The intellectual property that is resident in the mind of the engineers, will ultimately
leave with him when he goes. Certain intellectual property can stay with the company,
such as the patents, papers, documented designs and procedures that go with delivered
equipment. However, according to one PTL, "expertise belongs to the individual
employees, you cannot transfer the 'vision' that resides in the minds of the people". That
vision is what enables these engineers to 'see' new solutions, and create means and
methods to test products that are continually evolving into more and more complex
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devices.
Security products, for instance, are getting so sophisticated, that the test algorithms
virtually need to have some built in 'artificial intelligence' as the operational codes
change with each use. Needless to say, it becomes somewhat difficult to reliably test
something that is not the same twice, yet it was done routinely by the test engineers at
EDT. This is the kind of vision and expertise that is lost when the company loses these
most valuable resources.
What will the company gain from this move, in terms of technology? One PTL says "the
experience the company will gain is in terms of lessons learned from the move to
headquarters, additional technology will not be gained as a result of the move". The
possibility of the company gaining technology through this move seems to be ambiguous
point. Armin, (EE) says" the company is too big to gain experience, individuals yes, the
company, no". Yet others say "some will be lost some gained in the form of new people
hiring in to replace the ones lost". (Supv) It is true that these new people will bring with
them new ideas and experience that will be infused into the company, but whether they
will actually bring new technology is a matter of definition. What is known, is that the
EDT expertise is in large part lost.
One of TEO's tasks, intended to utilize the experience and knowledge of this group from
EDT, was to lead the effort to commonize test platforms and engineering design rules
company wide. It is the only department in the company that is doing this, so by default,
it is leading the effort. The vision of what is required to bring this about is what is
desired here, and that vision is only developed through many years of experiential
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learning, (trial and error). This was one question that both the TEO and UDEF
respondents disagreed. UDEF, being a plant, has a different focus and according to one
PTL "they (TEO) are doing just the opposite (of commonizing), by moving in a new
direction, outsourcing and making these engineers specifications writers".
The decision to adopt technology is influenced by the technology itself (DeLaGarza and
Mitropoulos, 1993), as in the case ofCTP. Ifthe technology fails to live up to the
expectations of the eventual users, then its implementation will not be successful. This is
exactly what happened with CTP. There were a couple of testers delivered (functionally
a beta site), using the first version of the CTP platform which was Lab Windows @
based, and served as an operational tester and advertisement of things to come. These
were operational test platforms that were less complicated than some of the others that
were required. The plant was promised the upgrades using Windows NT @ and Borland
C++ as soon as it was ready. However, these plans soon went awry.
Shortly after the announcement of the transition, one of the key architects of this software
found employment elsewhere, and the program began to slow down. As the weeks went
by, there was an average of 2-3 people each week tendering their resignations, and it
seemed the CTP group was getting hit the hardest. Without a strong core group to
complete the project, only parts of it were useful, and the debugging effort was taking all
of the time from the development work. It was quite difficult to assign individuals to
assist in this effort, as they had to be well versed in the platforms and languages being
used, and in the CTP protocols as well.
The established 'standard platform' group in the headquarters location, must have seen
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the problems coming and according to one senior engineer "they stipulated requirements
for CTP before it was delivered, and the platform couldn't meet it. The technical
challenges could not be overcome and it caused a rejection, similar to a body rejecting an
organ transplant due to unsuitability".
What will happen with CTP? No one really knows at this point, but as a senior engineer
stated "an engineer is a creature that likes to learn, likes to be challenged and will
ultimately rebuild the technology". CTP may just have come along at a wrong time and
perhaps it will lie dormant for a while, but ultimately the technology might one day be
rebuilt.
CQMMUNICATIONS FACTORS
Anything that impeded the communication within the organization as well as within the
environment it interacts in, will jeopardize the successful implementation of the
technology within the organization (Katz, 1988,p403).
The move from EDT to TEO improved the communications between the test and PEa
organizations, if for no other reason than the fact that the test engineers were now co-
located with the product teams as product development (PD) engineers. This side-by-
side working arrangement was one of the cornerstones of the case for making the move.
With real time interactions between these groups, the probability of having products
redesigned for the specific reasons of being testable or manufacturable would decrease.
The PD test engineer will work with the PEa engineers on the front end of the design
cycle, typically 2-3 years before the product is expected to reach customers. By having
this test and manufacturing experience on the same team in face to face working
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environments, great ideas for products that work once, but cannot be reliably
manufactured or tested are not pursued. Sometimes, incremental changes at the front end
will be able to prevent the developing of expensive tooling a second or third time. The
test engineers have already brought computer aided engineering (CAE) systems into play
on projects, that enabled one project to eliminate prototyping of very expensive tooling,
effectively paying for the PD engineer on that team. The communication stream is
further enhanced by the ownership aspect of living there and being part of the team from
the beginning. When one is at a distance of 500 miles, it is easier to go home for the
night, and leave the problem for someone else.
Another aspect of the new organization that improves communications is the central
location and proximity to other key organizations, often in the same building. Visibility
is certainly enhanced, and the decision makers are able to 'find time' in their busy day to
meet with each other and settle issues quickly, rather than going through the beauracratic
process of conference calls and meetings set up days in advance. Impromtu meetings in
the hallways can and are becoming standard fare.
The increased level of communications should (in theory) allow solutions to get to
customers faster, by reducing cycle times. When serious problems occur, there is a more
central location to direct information flows to and dispatch miniature 'swat teams' to the
trouble spots. These problems at plants, have the capability to stop a production line,
which in the automotive industry can get excessively costly fast. A loss of a single days
production could cost the company millions of dollars in lost revenue.
The UDEF groups direct reporting to TEO also provides for better communications with
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headquarters, and often times can result in resources being applied more quickly than was
otherwise possible. A phone call in the morning can have the required personnel on a
plane and working on the problem by mid-afternoon. The tie-in of TEO and PEO can
also provide the PEO resources to the plants on momentary notice, due to the closer
working relationships between the managers. Eventually all of the managers have a
common boss, and having the direct access to him now has perhaps changed the
dynamics of working together.
EXTERNAL FACTORS
One of the primary external factors involved in the move to of EDT to TEO was the
company 2000 initiative. This was a strategy to stream line the business, reduce the
levels of management from bottom to top (seven levels is the target), and get out of
unprofitable businesses and concentrate on the core business. Another part of this
strategy was to reduce the redundancies by removing identical design centers that were
operating on different continents with different design rules, but making ostensibly the
same product. This alone was a massive undertaking as the number of design centers
dropped to only five based upon the platform. Each platform has only one design center
now, which will reduce overhead tremendously. Instead of having products with the
same name that are functionally different versions, they will be the same, wherever they
are found in the world.
Reducing costs, removing redundant efforts, and the globalization of the world's
economy all figured into the push to move EDT to TEO. The company's decision to get
out of the businesses that are not part of its core had far reaching effects, and changed the
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lives of many people, both foreign and domestic.
CONCLUSIONS:
The move of EDT to TEO and UDEF was generally considered a positive step. UDEF
developed a small in-house group of test engineers that were better able to focus on their
number one customer, the EEe business. The UDEF group is a co-located group from
the TEO organization, but they are housed and operate from the UDEF base, reducing the
overall costs of overhead to the company, by spreading it out over a larger base. This
arrangement has additionally helped the plant develop a better local vendor source, which
has become a mandate for all of the plants, especially now that EDT is gone.
Part of the restructuring plan was for The company to get out of the equipment
engineering business completely and with the move to headquarters, this in fact
happened. The equipment that is built now in headquarters, is for engineering work only,
not for the production lines. Each plant it tasked with developing its own in-house group
of test engineers and local vendor sources for their capital equipment needs. Some of the
plants have this type of group already, and they will all fall under the TEO umbrella,
which gives them a voice and visibility in headquarters. There is a very definite cost
benefit from this, as the company will no longer incur the very high design and
development costs associated with these machines.
As TEO came into being, the test group developed better visibility and this in turn
developed better understanding of the tasks required by the larger entity. As the groups
(TEO) role expanded, new ideas were brought into the company of high volume
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manufacturing knowledge and experience, brought from the platforms of many plants and
many products.
There was a belief that by having the TEO group in headquarters, there would be better
acceptance of the common test platform (CTP). However, the reality was that too many
critical resources were lost due to the transition, and most of the core team left the
company. CTP, though accepted as a concept, never was grafted into the mainstream at
the company, but was rejected due to poor presentation and the lack of ability to solve
the technical challenges of the platform.
One of the critical aspects of the consolidation that hampered the overall early success,
was the lack of recognition of the importance of family life to the people of EDT.
Family, friends, quality of life, all these things ranked more highly than the job to the
people of EDT. This fact was borne out in graphic detail when the company could lure
only 22 of 72 full time employees (6 were supervisors), to headquarters, in spite of the
company going out of its way to provide a large range of options and incentives to its
employees. This relocation (or severance) package, was far more generous than anyone
had ever seen. Yet, in the final analysis, very few were willing to uproot themselves and
their families to follow the job. Times are changing, and there appears to be a shift away
from "employer mandated" changes, at least in the world of the these technical
professionals.
The company underestimated the strength of the technical job market in the local area,
and the will of the vast majority not to disrupt their families. These factors were critical
influences in the limited early success of the transition. On the positive side, TEO did
become the organization it was intended to be, it just took longer than anticipated, and
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was far more painful to all concerned than was initially believed.
By locating TE's at UDEF, the quality of support and service improved. The response
time was immediate, and the fact of living in the plant created a sense of ownership
among the engineers, something that previously did not exist, even when EDT was only
five miles away. The TE's did in fact provide excellent support previously, but the
problems were actually someone else's and the TE had more than one project to take care
of.
The plant's view having the TE's in house as a positive move, as evidenced by UDEF
picking up a number ofTE's directly to be part of the UDEF plant working on specific
lines. These engineers are part of the UDEF head count, unlike the co-located TEO
engineers. Technical people are welcomed at a technical plant. In reality it is a good
match of skills and requirements. The headquarters location however, is a little more
political, and sometimes technicm. types can be misfits in that arena.
Will The company receive the $50 million benefit over five years that was projected?
Only time will tell for sure, but with the TEO organization in place, the TE expertise is
already being applied directly to the component manufacturing level, and gains have been
realized. A case in point is the CAE tools to create a software prototype, which
eliminated the cost of some very expensive tooling prototypes, and enabled the creation
of production level tooling on the first pass. This is a tremendous cost savings realized,
as previously there would have been multiple setups and recursive iterations of the same
tools.
When The company made the decision to move EDT, the people resisted the change, but
the change happened, the people moved on and the system is still working. It will take
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several years to get things going smoothly again, but by then, there will no doubt be
another structural reorganization, and another and another....
Change is good, it keeps people from becoming complacent.
GLOSSARY
EDT
TEO
CTP
PEO
UDEF
EEC
QC
PTL
EE
ME
CN
PROOFS
Equipment Development and Test
Test Engineering Organization
Common Test Platform
Product Engineering Organization
Upper Darby Electronics Facility
Electronic Engine Control
Quality Control
Project Team Leader
Electrical Engineer
Mechanical Engineer
Corporate News
Professional Office internal commmunications
network
DUT Device Under Test
TE Test Engineer
PD Product Development (test engineer)
CAE Computer Aided Engineering
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APPENDIX
Chronology:
Feb 1996 Transition meeting with study team and EDT supervisors, managers, and
PTL's.
July 1996
May 1996 Formal announcement of transition and the change to TEO made via
press release.
Promise date for relocation/severance packages to be delivered to
employees.
Aug 1996 Actual date relocation packages delivered.
Sept. 1996 Management team from EDT starts the transition to TEO, group officially
Oct 1996
Nov 1996
June 1997
July 1997
Oct. 1997
Jan 1998
dual location based, Germantown, Pa., and headquarters.
Date all decisions must be formalized in writing.
UDEF starts to absorb some of the EDT personnel as full time UDEF
employees, for work on specific projects within the plant, (not part of the
TEO co-located team).
Expected closure date of the EDT facility
TEO reorganizes with a new department manager, and is renamed to
Product Assurance.
Viseon is formed as an "Enterprise of the company", taking the
place of the former Components Division (CD). Viseon ( CD) is the
overall division that contains all of the electronics plants, EDT, TEO and
PA, along with numerous other product and test organizations.
TEO co-located team takes up residence at UDEF, actually maintaining
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Mar 1998
two offices for a short time.
Actual closure date of EDT facility.
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Vita:
Robert Joseph Pummer: Born in Allentown, Pa. on August 24, 1954. Married to Cynthia
(Lichman) on Sept. 3, 1977, two children, Juliann(20), & Christopher(l6), One
grandchild, Elijah(1).
Parents: W1'11iam J. Pummer (IOF Financial Analyst, ret.)
Margaret V. Pummer (formerly Schlosser)
Married May 29, 1943 (55 years)
Ten children, five boys, five girls.
Institutions Attended: LCCC, Schnecksville, Pa.; East Carolina University, Cherry Point,
N.C.; Coastal Carolina CC, Jacksonville, N.C. (Electronics Servicing Diploma 1980,);
Christian Brothers College, Memphis, Tn. (Academic scholarship $1000/yr, 1982);
USMC Staff Academy, Quantico, Va.; University of Arizona, Tucson, Az.; Pima
Community College, Tucson, Az.; Chapman University, Tucson, Az.(Bachelor of
Science in Electronics, 1988); Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa. (Master of Science
Mangement of Technology, 1998).
Professional Experience: USMC 1975-1983, including two years as Electronics
instructor at Marine Air Traffic Control Communications command, Memphis, Tn.
Hughes Aircraft Co., Tucson, Az. 1983-1988: Systems Support Engineer, for Systems
Support Validation Lab.
Hughes Aircraft Co., Las Vegas, Nv. 1988-1990: Systems Design Engineer.
AM Communications, 1990-1993; RF design engineer.
Ford Equipment Development and Test., Germantown, Pa. 1993-1997; Design test
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engineer, Customer Service test engineer, Project Team Leader (IDM, Electric Vehicle)
Ford Microelectronics Industries, 1997- Present; Test Development engineer, Project
manager test engineering (high volume accelerometer testing).
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